A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2013.05.011zbMath1286.91060arXiv1204.5551OpenAlexW2049445537WikidataQ59927005 ScholiaQ59927005MaRDI QIDQ2450692

Omer Tamuz

Publication date: 15 May 2014

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5551

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmonopolygeometric expectation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites Work

• On the Lambert \(w\) function
• Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctions
• Fundamental Probability
• Optimal Auction Design

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