A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2013.07.006zbMath1286.91099OpenAlexW2085609135MaRDI QIDQ2450713

Naoyuki Kamiyama

Publication date: 15 May 2014

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessserial dictatorshipmatching market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints ⋮ Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas ⋮ Matchings with lower quotas: algorithms and complexity ⋮ Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy ⋮ Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers

Cites Work

• The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
• Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Matching with quorums
• A Matroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
• The Hospitals/Residents Problem with Quota Lower Bounds
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

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