A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.08.033zbMath1288.91111OpenAlexW2162975085MaRDI QIDQ2451422

Swaprava Nath, Onno R. Zoeter

Publication date: 3 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.033

zbMATH Keywords

efficient mechanismsinterdependent valueex-post individual rationalityex-post incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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