Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0634-2zbMath1288.91019OpenAlexW2158691675MaRDI QIDQ2452118

Yukihiko Funaki, Yuan Ju, René van den Brink

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0634-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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