A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0638-yzbMath1288.91062OpenAlexW2141806469WikidataQ123130237 ScholiaQ123130237MaRDI QIDQ2452120

Felix Brandt, Maria Chudnovsky, Ilhee Kim, Gaku Liu, Serguei Norine, P. D. Seymour, Steéphan Thomassé, Alexander D. Scott

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0638-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox ⋮ Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters

Cites Work

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• Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
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• Slater's winners of a tournament may not be in the Banks set
• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
• A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• Tournament solutions and majority voting

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