The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6zbMath1287.91069OpenAlexW2152447915MaRDI QIDQ2452137

Olivier Bochet, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems

Cites Work

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• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

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