On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0665-3zbMath1288.91064OpenAlexW2082491017MaRDI QIDQ2452244

Abhijit Chandra, Sunanda Roy

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0665-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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