An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0615-5zbMath1287.91117OpenAlexW1963788215MaRDI QIDQ2452262

Takumi Kongo

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0615-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• An impossibility theorem for matching problems
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• On cores and indivisibility
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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