Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0595-5zbMath1288.00035OpenAlexW2145696312MaRDI QIDQ2452268
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0595-5
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social choice (91B14) External book reviews (00A17)
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- Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- Game Theory
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