Montague's paradox, informal provability, and explicit modal logic

DOI10.1215/00294527-2420636zbMath1352.03062OpenAlexW2052092367MaRDI QIDQ2452676

Walter Dean

Publication date: 4 June 2014

Published in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1398345779

zbMATH Keywords

constructive proofprovability logicexplicit modal logicjustification logicinformal proofknower paradoxMontague's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Metamathematics of constructive systems (03F50) Proof theory in general (including proof-theoretic semantics) (03F03) Provability logics and related algebras (e.g., diagonalizable algebras) (03F45)

Related Items

The paradox of the knower revisited, Solutions to the knower paradox in the light of Haack's criteria

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