The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.12.001zbMath1291.91016OpenAlexW2164450743MaRDI QIDQ2452807

André Casajus

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68233

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values ⋮ Gain-loss and new axiomatizations of the Shapley value ⋮ Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions ⋮ Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games ⋮ New axiomatizations of the Owen value ⋮ A new Shapley value for games with fuzzy coalitions ⋮ A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance

Cites Work

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• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Semivalues of Simple Games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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