Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.021zbMath1292.91134OpenAlexW1993636555MaRDI QIDQ2452992

Peter Tillmann

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021

zbMATH Keywords

robust controlmonetary policyKnightian uncertaintypotential outputmonetary delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty

Cites Work

• Uncertain potential output: Implications for monetary policy
• Endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output
• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORK
• Robustness

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