Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: the unassigned-offeror problem

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.09.016zbMath1288.91108OpenAlexW3122835691MaRDI QIDQ2453039

Kathryn E. Spier, Claudia M. Landeo

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12967824

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationexperimentsbusiness deadlockshotgun mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• How to divide the possession of a football?
• A Game of Fair Division

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