Asymmetric information may protect the commons: the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.09.032zbMath1288.91158OpenAlexW1968726772MaRDI QIDQ2453049

Felix Munoz-Garcia, Ana Espínola-Arredondo

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.09.032

zbMATH Keywords

signalingwelfareentry deterrencecommons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model
• Entry Deterrence in the Commons

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