Second-price ad auctions with binary bids and markets with good competition

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2013.08.022;zbMath1422.91304MaRDI QIDQ2453168

Rafael C. S. Schouery, Cristina G. Fernandes

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397513006464/pdfft?isDTMRedir=true&download=true

zbMATH Keywords

matchingsapproximation algorithmscombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Serve or skip: the power of rejection in online bottleneck matching

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Advertisement allocation for generalized second-pricing schemes
• Complexity of approximating bounded variants of optimization problems
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Online Primal-Dual Algorithms for Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue
• Budgeted Allocations in the Full-Information Setting
• On Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Ad Auctions
• Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems

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