A characterization of the single-crossing domain

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0717-8zbMath1288.91049OpenAlexW1964590038MaRDI QIDQ2453407

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Gerhard J. Woeginger

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0717-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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