The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9zbMath1288.91080OpenAlexW2072638065MaRDI QIDQ2453425

Rémy Oddou, Nicolas Gravel, Rongili Biswas

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously?

Cites Work

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