Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0381-yzbMath1304.91040OpenAlexW2237409375MaRDI QIDQ2453491

Igal Milchtaich

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0381-y

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriummechanismgames with incomplete informationBayesian gamesextraneous signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

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Cites Work

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