Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
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Publication:2453823
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.001zbMath1291.91068OpenAlexW2095609010MaRDI QIDQ2453823
Publication date: 11 June 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.001
Related Items
Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities, Bounds for the Nakamura number, Basis for binary comparisons and non-standard probabilities, The finagle point might not be within the \(\varepsilon \)-core, Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals, Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
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