Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing
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Publication:2453835
DOI10.1007/s10114-014-3055-1zbMath1312.68019OpenAlexW1986879524MaRDI QIDQ2453835
Publication date: 11 June 2014
Published in: Acta Mathematica Sinica. English Series (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2535/1/WRAP_Chen_9471193-wbs-060110-submitted_version.pdf
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