Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002zbMath1256.91023OpenAlexW2143502829MaRDI QIDQ2455656

David McAdams

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenessall-pay auctioninterdependent valuesfirst-price auctionaffiliation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation ⋮ Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions ⋮ Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: comment ⋮ Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders

Cites Work

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• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.

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