Efficient collusion in optimal auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.003zbMath1281.91087OpenAlexW2081580859MaRDI QIDQ2455663

Vianney Dequiedt

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/gael/files/doc-recherche/WP/A2006/gael2006-10.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusionthird partyoptimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion ⋮ Mechanism design with informational punishment ⋮ Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion ⋮ Optimal collusion with internal contracting ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Optimal collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

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