On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
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Publication:2455667
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.002zbMath1281.91034OpenAlexW1980918267MaRDI QIDQ2455667
Publication date: 26 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.002
Related Items (9)
Common belief in approximate rationality ⋮ Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria ⋮ Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ Epistemically robust strategy subsets ⋮ SMALL INFINITARY EPISTEMIC LOGICS ⋮ Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
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- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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