On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.002zbMath1281.91034OpenAlexW1980918267MaRDI QIDQ2455667

Tai-Wei Hu

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecommon \(p\)-beliefrationalizable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (9)

Common belief in approximate rationality ⋮ Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria ⋮ Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ Epistemically robust strategy subsets ⋮ SMALL INFINITARY EPISTEMIC LOGICS ⋮ Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria

Cites Work

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• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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