Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
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Publication:2455677
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007zbMath1281.91123OpenAlexW2124372635MaRDI QIDQ2455677
Publication date: 26 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
Related Items (19)
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ Unique stable matchings ⋮ Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems ⋮ Optimal truncation in matching markets ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Stability with one-sided incomplete information ⋮ School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms ⋮ Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation ⋮ Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences ⋮ Self-selection in school choice ⋮ Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
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