Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria
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Publication:2455679
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.003zbMath1281.91027OpenAlexW2148587102MaRDI QIDQ2455679
Publication date: 26 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.003
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