War and peace in veto voting

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2006.12.039zbMath1137.91374OpenAlexW2034818377MaRDI QIDQ2456439

Vladimir A. Gurvich

Publication date: 18 October 2007

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.12.039

zbMATH Keywords

blockcoalitionplayeroutcomeveto powersocial choice correspondencesocial choice functionvoting by vetoeffectivity functionvotervoting schemecandidateveto functionveto resistance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Computing lexicographically safe Nash equilibria in finite two-person games with tight game forms given by oracles ⋮ On effectivity functions of game forms

Cites Work

• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Progress on perfect graphs
• Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
• The Proportional Veto Principle
• The solvability of positional games in pure strategies
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