Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0193-0zbMath1135.91012OpenAlexW2129200428MaRDI QIDQ2460080

Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0193-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence ⋮ Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence ⋮ Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives ⋮ Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach ⋮ Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem

Cites Work

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• A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
• The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
• Dictatorial domains
• Information and preference aggregation
• A note on natural correspondences that satisfy exclusion
• Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
• Preferences, Summation, and Social Welfare Functions
• Mathematical Derivation of an Election System

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