Robustness against inefficient manipulation

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0197-9zbMath1138.91018OpenAlexW2093826022MaRDI QIDQ2460084

Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0197-9

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilityscoring rulevoting rulecoalitional manipulationCondorcet rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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