The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.004zbMath1271.91019OpenAlexW3013762119MaRDI QIDQ2462287

Luc Lauwers, László Á. Kóczy

Publication date: 30 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2002/Volume28/EB-02AA0011A.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coreabsorbing setdynamic solutionnon-emptiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

On the characterizations of viable proposals ⋮ NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ On the accessibility of the core ⋮ Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games

Cites Work

• The coalition structure core is accessible
• A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• A property of the core
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
• Viable Proposals

This page was built for publication: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension