Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006zbMath1271.91071OpenAlexW2123779661MaRDI QIDQ2462290

Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó

Publication date: 30 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencystrategy-proofnesssingle-peakednessbribe-proofnessreplacement monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (7)

Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources ⋮ Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• Manipulation through bribes
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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