Coercion, contract and the limits of the market

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0245-0zbMath1180.91176OpenAlexW3124879457MaRDI QIDQ2464040

Kaushik Basu

Publication date: 10 December 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/06-01.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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