Distributed knowability and Fitch's paradox

DOI10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9zbMath1132.03004OpenAlexW1969655817MaRDI QIDQ2464652

Rafał Palczewski

Publication date: 17 December 2007

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9

zbMATH Keywords

anti-realismFitch's paradoxknowabilitygroup knowledgemodal epistemic logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (1)

The many faces of closure and introspection. An ineractive perspective

Cites Work

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