The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
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Publication:2466862
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.002zbMath1150.91006OpenAlexW2084606423MaRDI QIDQ2466862
Publication date: 16 January 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79851/
Related Items (14)
Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models ⋮ No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors ⋮ Monologues, dialogues, and common priors ⋮ Belief consistency and trade consistency ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Agreeing to agree and Dutch books ⋮ Countable spaces and common priors ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors ⋮ Common priors under endogenous uncertainty ⋮ Agreeing to disagree in a countable space of equiprobable states of nature ⋮ Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria ⋮ PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE ⋮ Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
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- A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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