The positive foundation of the common prior assumption

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.002zbMath1150.91006OpenAlexW2084606423MaRDI QIDQ2466862

Aviad Heifetz

Publication date: 16 January 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79851/

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Related Items (14)

Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models ⋮ No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors ⋮ Monologues, dialogues, and common priors ⋮ Belief consistency and trade consistency ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Agreeing to agree and Dutch books ⋮ Countable spaces and common priors ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors ⋮ Common priors under endogenous uncertainty ⋮ Agreeing to disagree in a countable space of equiprobable states of nature ⋮ Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria ⋮ PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE ⋮ Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors

Cites Work

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• Learning to agree
• On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Agreeing to agree
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Conditioning as disintegration
• A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Quantified beliefs and believed quantities

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