Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2006.06.004zbMath1163.91503OpenAlexW2015156887MaRDI QIDQ2467483

Mourad Baïou, Michel Balinski

Publication date: 21 January 2008

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

many-to-many matchinguniversity admissionsstable marriagestable assignmenttwo-sided marketordinal transportation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ A note on many-to-many matchings and stable allocations

Cites Work

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