An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
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Publication:2467515
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0193-4zbMath1142.91443OpenAlexW1971328907MaRDI QIDQ2467515
Publication date: 22 January 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0193-4
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