Identification of Pareto-improving policies: Information as the real invisible hand

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.008zbMath1151.91606OpenAlexW1994241118MaRDI QIDQ2469550

Andrés Carvajal, Herakles M. Polemarchakis

Publication date: 6 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.008

zbMATH Keywords

identificationgeneral equilibriumconstrained suboptimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

Idiosyncratic risk and financial policy

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