When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.07.009zbMath1132.91375OpenAlexW2170044545MaRDI QIDQ2475171

Ming Li, Kristóf Madarász

Publication date: 10 March 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

cheap-talkdisclosureconflicts of interest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (13)

Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk ⋮ Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ De-biasing strategic communication ⋮ A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases ⋮ A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research ⋮ Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case

Cites Work

• Strategic argumentation
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Professional advice
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Authority and Communication in Organizations

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