Modeling dynamic sealed-offer \(k\)-double auctions using a mixture of distributions

DOI10.1016/J.MCM.2004.12.013zbMath1132.91446OpenAlexW1983854375MaRDI QIDQ2476687

Christopher Keller

Publication date: 12 March 2008

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2004.12.013

zbMATH Keywords

marketsestimationpriceauctionsanalytic solutiondistribution functionequilibrium behaviormixture distributionprobabilistic modelssellerbuyer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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