A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2007.08.007zbMath1136.91316OpenAlexW2040660036MaRDI QIDQ2479244

Takehiro Inohara, Masahito Kitamura

Publication date: 26 March 2008

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2007.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycoalitiongroup decision makingsimple gamesblockability relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (5)

Methods for comparison of coalition influence on games in characteristic function form and their interrelationships ⋮ A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation ⋮ Coalition values derived from methods for comparison of coalition influence for games in characteristic function form ⋮ Fundamentals of simple games from a viewpoint of blockability relations ⋮ OPEN PROBLEMS IN VETO THEORY

Cites Work

• The desirability relation of simple games
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
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