On sabotage in collective tournaments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.07.004zbMath1133.91304OpenAlexW2042028185WikidataQ123260570 ScholiaQ123260570MaRDI QIDQ2482642

Oliver Gürtler

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

complementaritiessabotagecollective tournament

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (3)

Equal, proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage ⋮ Sabotage in dynamic tournaments ⋮ Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• A collective tournament
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS

This page was built for publication: On sabotage in collective tournaments