Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.10.002zbMath1133.91531OpenAlexW3121399372MaRDI QIDQ2482644

Thomas A. Weber, Abhishek Bapna

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/187503/files/Weber-Bapna-JME.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designBayesian incentive compatibilitydirect revelation mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions
• \(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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