Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
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Publication:2482669
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0079-0zbMath1146.91031OpenAlexW1988652551MaRDI QIDQ2482669
David Cantala, Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0079-0
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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