Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
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Publication:2482671
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0081-6zbMath1139.91025OpenAlexW2163984834MaRDI QIDQ2482671
Olle Häggström, Kimmo Eriksson
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0081-6
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Cites Work
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- On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
- Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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