Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2482681
DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6zbMath1142.91049DBLPjournals/ijgt/Roth08OpenAlexW3122031757WikidataQ56482747 ScholiaQ56482747MaRDI QIDQ2482681
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13225.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (54)
Linkage based deferred acceptance optimization ⋮ Stable Marriage and Roommates Problems with Restricted Edges: Complexity and Approximability ⋮ Responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm ⋮ Testing substitutability of weak preferences ⋮ Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems ⋮ Stable matchings of teachers to schools ⋮ ReGale: some memorable results ⋮ Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand ⋮ Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests ⋮ Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of theHeiseimunicipal amalgamations ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Many-to-many matching based task allocation for dispersed computing ⋮ Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching ⋮ Unique stable matchings ⋮ Testing substitutability ⋮ School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action ⋮ Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets ⋮ Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods ⋮ A dynamic school choice model ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ Market structure and matching with contracts ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets ⋮ The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games ⋮ Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences ⋮ Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability ⋮ The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment ⋮ Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis ⋮ Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion ⋮ Median stable matching for markets with wages ⋮ An advanced parking navigation system for downtown parking ⋮ Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching ⋮ Uniqueness of \(DP\)-Nash subgraphs and \(D\)-sets in weighted graphs of Netflix games ⋮ An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley “propose-and-reject” algorithm ⋮ Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY ⋮ Bipartite choices
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Courtship and linear programming
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- Stable matchings with couples
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Efficient priority rules
- The assignment game. I: The core
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- Kidney Exchange
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting
- NP-complete stable matching problems
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets
This page was built for publication: Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
