The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
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Publication:2482919
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.005zbMath1135.91353OpenAlexW3122428314WikidataQ56658234 ScholiaQ56658234MaRDI QIDQ2482919
Publication date: 28 April 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/9001/1/ce-0002.pdf
Related Items (27)
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions ⋮ Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions ⋮ COMPARISONS ON LARGEST ORDER STATISTICS FROM HETEROGENEOUS GAMMA SAMPLES ⋮ Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ IPV model with Cobb-Douglas and reference-dependent utility functions ⋮ Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions ⋮ A pre-emption model of mergers ⋮ A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF ASYMMETRY ON REVENUE IN SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? ⋮ Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions ⋮ Stochastic comparisons on sample extremes of dependent and heterogenous observations ⋮ Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders ⋮ On the Lorenz ordering of order statistics from exponential populations and some applications ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ On the effects of banks' equity ownership on credit markets ⋮ Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions ⋮ Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
Cites Work
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- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
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