Preference-based belief operators
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Publication:2485457
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.001zbMath1099.91033OpenAlexW2112574810MaRDI QIDQ2485457
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.001
Related Items (10)
Lexicographic beliefs and assumption ⋮ Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability ⋮ My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes ⋮ Preference-based belief operators ⋮ Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games ⋮ Simple hyperintensional belief revision ⋮ On Revocable and Irrevocable Belief Revision ⋮ DYNAMIC HYPERINTENSIONAL BELIEF REVISION
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