Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game
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Publication:2485485
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00051-4zbMath1099.91031WikidataQ59540676 ScholiaQ59540676MaRDI QIDQ2485485
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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