Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.006zbMath1117.91021OpenAlexW2103413037MaRDI QIDQ2485492

Mark Fey, John Duggan

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/2121

zbMATH Keywords

Office-motivationPolicy-motivationProbabilistic votingSpatial model of voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (19)

Multidimensional political competition with non-common beliefs ⋮ Electoral competition under costly policy implementation ⋮ A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters ⋮ Endogenous voting agendas ⋮ A theory of voting in large elections ⋮ Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates ⋮ Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model ⋮ A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games ⋮ Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence ⋮ Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics ⋮ Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel ⋮ Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates ⋮ Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models ⋮ Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules ⋮ The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates ⋮ Application of a theorem in stochastic models of elections ⋮ Valence, complementarities, and political polarization ⋮ Political engineering: optimizing a U.S. Presidential candidate's platform ⋮ Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games

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• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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