Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
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Publication:2486410
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.10.005zbMath1114.91008OpenAlexW2137564301MaRDI QIDQ2486410
Lia van Wesenbeeck, Michiel A. Keyzer
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.10.005
Kernel density estimationNon-cooperative gamesRefinementsBest-response dynamicsMollifier methodNonstationary stochastic approximationStochastic quasi gradient methods (SQG)
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Cites Work
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