Encouraging a coalition formation

DOI10.1007/s11238-004-5631-9zbMath1127.91308OpenAlexW4213327956MaRDI QIDQ2487766

Michael Maschler

Publication date: 8 August 2005

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp392.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesgame theorycoalition formationsexperiments in game theorypower of a coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication

Cites Work

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• The general nucleolus and the reduced game property
• A generalization of the Kohlberg criterion
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• Coalition Formation in a Five-Person Market Game
• The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts
• The Nucleolus of a Matrix Game and Other Nucleoli
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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